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Global International Relations and the Arab Spring: The 
Maghreb’s Challenge to the EU 
 
Abstract 
This article contributes to the Global International Relations 
project by critically evaluating the roles ascribed to Europe 
and the EU by Levitsky and Way in their model for explaining 
regime transitions. Focusing primarily on their international 
dimensions of linkage and leverage, it assesses both the 
normative geopolitical underpinnings and explanatory power of 
their thesis drawing on the North African cases of Tunisia and 
Mauritania at the start of the Arab Spring to illustrate and 
substantiate its observations and arguments. It concludes that 
the EU’s failure to discipline either country’s competitive 
authoritarian regime raises important questions about the 
validity of the privileged role in which they cast Europe. 
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Introduction 
This article contributes to the Global International Relations 
(GIR) project by critically engaging with Steven Levitsky and 
Lucan Way’s celebrated model for explaining regime 
transitions. They contend that proximity to Europe holds the 
key to whether a regime democratises or remains authoritarian. 
For such propinquity, they maintain, causes countries to forge 
links with the EU – economic, intergovernmental, technocratic, 
social, information and civil society – that not only make 
Brussels more likely to respond to any authoritarian abuses 
that their governments commit, but also give the European 
Union the means with which to discipline those who are 
responsible. Levitsky and Way cast the bloc, therefore, as a 
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locus of political liberalism from which human and civil 
rights are spread around the world by means of its example and 
efforts.1  
 
The article’s interrogation of this claim has two 
interconnected elements. One is an examination of the 
normative geopolitical assumptions on which it is based, of 
the central privileged role it ascribes to Europe and the EU. 
And the other, is an assessment of its accuracy, of whether 
the bloc consistently acts as a democratising force. Thus, the 
article charts and examines the core components of Levitsky 
and Way’s model and the reliability of their arguments. To 
help illustrate and corroborate this critical analysis, the 
article then draws on the cases of Tunisia and Mauritania at 
the start of the Arab Spring to show that, irrespective of 
each country’s distance from Europe, the EU exerted little 
influence on their respective regime outcomes.  
 
Tunisia and Mauritania are ideal case studies because they are 
both close to Europe and were once colonised by France. 
Levitsky and Way argue that the strength and breadth of a 
country’s links to the West are ‘rooted’ in geography and 
history.2 Their shared proximity to the EU, therefore, 
eliminates distance as a possible cause of their differing 
relations with Brussels. That is, Tunisia’s much closer ties 
to the bloc cannot be attributed to its greater propinquity to 
Europe. This difference can be accounted for, however, by 
history. For while both countries were colonised by France, 
Tunisia’s colonial experience was longer and more intense than 
that of Mauritania. This means that geography and history have 
affected these countries largely as Levitsky and Way said they 
would. Their non-liberalisation prior to the Arab Spring, 
therefore, challenges Levitsky and Way’s view of the EU as one 
of the world’s moral and political centrifuges.  
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The article’s principal claims to originality are its 
contribution to the GIR through its engagement with Levitsky 
and Way’s thesis, and critical assessment of their model in 
the contexts of Tunisia and Mauritania. To sustain these 
arguments, the paper is divided into four main parts. In the 
first, it provides an overview of the GIR project. In the 
second, it gives a summary of Levitsky and Way’s thesis and, 
in particular, their views on Europe and North America, and 
how these regions influence the political development of the 
rest of the world. In the third it applies their dimension of 
linkage to Tunisia and Mauritania at the start of the Arab 
Spring. And in the fourth it applies their dimension of 
leverage to these countries over the same period. In making 
this case, the article builds directly on my earlier work 
applying Levitsky and Way’s model to the countries of the 
Maghreb over the period of the Arab Spring. More specifically, 
it seeks to illuminate and analyse some of the key normative 
assumptions underpinning their thesis and possible tensions in 
their argument. 
 
The Global International Relations Project 
‘That the study of International Relations [IR] – its main 
theories, its dominant centres of teaching and research, its 
leading publications – neglects and marginalises the world 
beyond the West is no longer a novel argument that requires 
proof or elaboration’.3 What is also largely accepted by IR 
scholars is the undesirability of this situation. For it means 
that the discipline’s experiential and evidential base is 
simply too narrow to capture fully and explain accurately the 
wider ‘social world’.4 Furthermore, it ensures that the 
influence of the West both within and through International 
Relations remains intact and continues.  
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The GIR is one of a number of initiatives intended to address 
this issue. Named and led by Amitav Acharya, it builds 
directly on another project he launched with Barry Buzan a 
decade before that sought to explain ‘the absence of non-
Western’ IR theory (IRT).5 Many of the key observations and 
conclusions of this earlier venture have inspired and informed 
the ‘six main dimensions’ on which the GIR is based. These 
include: a commitment to ‘pluralistic universalism’, to 
‘recognizing and respecting … diversity’ rather than applying 
Western-based concepts and arguments to everyone else; a 
grounding ‘in world …, not just Graeco-Roman, European, or US 
history’ (emphasis original); a desire to ‘substitute[], 
rather than supplant[], existing IR theories and methods’; a 
determination to integrate ‘the study of regions, 
regionalisms, and area studies’; a rejection of 
‘exceptionalism’; and, a recognition of ‘multiple forms of 
agency beyond material power, including [those of] resistance, 
normative action, and local constructions of global order’.6  
 
The GIR, then, is not a theory ‘but an aspiration for greater 
inclusiveness and diversity’ in IR.7 It does not seek, 
therefore, ‘to displace existing (or future) theories … that 
may substantially originate from Western ideas and 
experiences’, but to encourage the generation of alternatives 
that are rooted in the global South.8 Indeed, Acharya is 
sympathetic to the efforts of those who are trying to bridge 
‘the North-South gap in IRT by … testing, extending and 
revising existing theories’.9 He acknowledges that Realism has 
drawn insights from other countries and regions to develop 
approaches ‘more relevant’ to their experiences, and that 
constructivism, with its greater emphasis on culture and 
identity, has encouraged and enabled more scholarship to be 
undertaken on Africa, Asia and Latin America.10 He also credits 
the critical theories – Marxism, post-structuralism and, in 
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particular, post-colonialism and feminism – with broadening 
‘the relevance and appeal of IR … around the world’ by 
speaking more directly to the interests and concerns of this 
wider audience and pressing mainstream IR to try to do the 
same.11 
 
Acharya’s desire to transcend the distinction between the West 
and the Rest, and any ‘similar binary and mutually exclusive 
categories’, helps distinguish his project from those seeking 
to inaugurate so-called ‘“post-Western”’ IR.12 Unlike these 
other ventures, the GIR does not disavow or want to displace 
the discipline’s existing concepts and theories. Rather, it 
wants to add to them, to incorporate new ideas and arguments 
that are rooted in non-Western contexts and environments in 
order to make IR more global in its understanding and outlook.  
 
Yet, even though he may be more appreciative of both the 
West’s ongoing contributions to IR and the efforts of those 
trying to adapt its theories to the rest of the world, Acharya 
still believes that these efforts are, by themselves, 
insufficient to recalibrate the discipline in the ways and to 
the extent that he thinks is necessary. For such endeavours 
cannot change the origins of these theories or, by extension, 
prevent or alter their inherent power-projection and normative 
functions. Acharya, like Buzan, concurs with Robert Cox (1981, 
128) that ‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ 
(emphasis original).13 So, despite the success of the 
‘constructivist turn’ in fostering ‘a growing body of 
theoretical work on Africa, Asia and Latin America’,14 all of 
IR’s main theories and ideas remain ‘deeply rooted in the 
particularities and peculiarities of European history’ and 
‘the rise of the West to world power’.15 As such, they not only 
reflect, but help perpetuate the disparity in global power 
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that continues to sustain the West’s pre-eminence over the 
Rest. 
 
The GIR project, therefore, has both theoretical and normative 
implications. Since, in encouraging more challenges to 
mainstream IRT ‘from outside the West’,16 it is also calling 
for, and trying to bring about, a redistribution in global 
power. This is also an objective of at least some of those who 
are attempting to extend and adapt Realism, Liberalism, 
Constructivism and the English School to non-Western scenarios 
and situations. Yet, according to Acharya, these endeavours 
can never succeed because of where they are being launched 
from, namely, within mainstream IR. So, while the GIR may have 
similar goals to these initiatives, it is separated from them 
by its potential, by its greater ability to help affect a 
redistribution in global power. 
 
The GIR is also distinct from the more critical theories. 
These are arguably even more closely aligned to the project’s 
intellectual and normative objectives. Indeed, Acharya and 
Buzan acknowledge that post-colonialism has ‘a strong claim’ 
to being ‘an indigenous theory’, to incorporating and 
representing the ideas, values, cultures and interests of the 
global South.17 Yet, according to Acharya and Buzan, who draw 
on an argument made by Aijaz Ahmad,18 post-colonialism is less 
concerned than the GIR with producing ‘“fresh knowledges about 
what was until recently called the Third-World”’ and more 
focused on restructuring ‘“existing bodies of knowledge into 
the poststructuralist paradigms”’ and with occupying ‘“sites 
of cultural production outside the Euro-American zones by 
globalizing concerns and orientations originating at the 
central sites of Euro-American cultural production”’.19 
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The GIR, then, occupies a unique space in the discipline. It 
is different from mainstream IRT by not being a theory and its 
greater ability to address the discipline’s normative 
functions. It is different from critical IRT by, again, not 
being a theory and its aim of generating new, non-Western 
knowledges. And it is different from similar post-Western 
projects by its critical, but less hostile, attitude towards 
mainstream IRT.  
 
Levitsky and Way, and the role of the West 
Levitsky and Way argue that competitive authoritarianism is a 
governance condition that has proliferated since the end of 
the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
dictatorial practices lost legitimacy and increasingly cost 
those who used them international political support and 
material assistance. The victory of the West in this great 
ideological confrontation not only established its political 
structures and practices as dynamic and successful, but also 
concentrated much of the world’s remaining development 
resources in its hands. Its triumph fostered an ‘“almost 
universal wish to imitate … [its] way of life”’ as well as 
give it the ability – by means of military interventions, 
economic incentives and pressure, and aid conditionality – to 
press authoritarian governments and leaders to moderating 
their behaviour and acting more democratically.20  
 
This normative change in the global environment led many 
dictatorial regimes around the world to introduce some liberal 
reforms, to combine ‘electoral competition with varying 
degrees of authoritarianism’.21 In so doing, their political 
systems became competitive inasmuch that opposition forces 
could use the country’s newly created or recently strengthened 
‘democratic institutions to contest vigorously – and, on 
occasion, successfully – for power’, but not fully liberal as 
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‘electoral manipulation, unfair media access, abuse of state 
resources, and varying degrees of harassment and violence 
skewed the playing field’ heavily in favour of those who held 
office already.22 Levitsky and Way describe these intermediate 
or hybrid regimes as competitive authoritarian since they were 
neither completely dictatorial nor totally democratic. 
 
Despite having cautioned against the ‘“excessive proliferation 
of new … concepts”’, Levitsky (and Way) argue ‘that 
competitive authoritarianism is a new phenomenon … that no 
existing term adequately captures’.23 They dismiss ‘generic 
intermediate categories such as hybrid regime, semi-democracy, 
… [and] Freedom House’s “partly free”’ on the grounds that 
‘democracy is multidimensional’ which means that ‘there are 
multiple ways to be partially democratic’.24 Thus, such labels 
are too broad for the type of regime that they identify which 
is only one sort of hybrid order. They also reject more 
specific descriptions of ‘existing subtypes of 
authoritarianism’ such as post-totalitarianism and 
bureaucratic authoritarianism because these ‘regimes are 
noncompetitive’.25 And they discount more recent terms like 
electoral authoritarianism and semi-authoritarianism because 
‘they have generally been defined broadly to refer to all 
authoritarian regimes with multiparty elections – both 
competitive and hegemonic’.26 
 
Levitsky and Way’s rejection of these terms and labels 
reflects their broader dissatisfaction with existing theories 
of regime transition. They dismiss the widely-held contention 
that competitive authoritarian regimes invariably democratise 
because they already exhibit some liberal characteristics. 
They observe that this is not always the case and that some 
regimes are able to adapt and survive, and remain in this 
condition for many years at a time. They also note that not 
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all of the regimes that do change became more democratic, that 
some grow increasingly authoritarian. These observations lead 
them to conclude that competitive authoritarianism is not a 
stepping stone towards full democracy and that political 
liberalisation is not a linear process. Rather, it is a 
distinct state of governance from which regimes can grow 
either more, or less, authoritarian. 
 
Levitsky and Way also aver that ‘the relationship between the 
international environment and regime change is poorly 
understood’.27 They argue that not enough effort has been made 
to ‘adjudicate among the various mechanisms of … [global] 
influence … or integrate them into a coherent theoretical 
framework’.28 They further note that ‘many analyses of 
international democratizing pressure give insufficient 
attention to how it varies – in both character and intensity – 
across cases and regions’.29 They maintain that ‘most studies … 
simply present a laundry list of the various mechanisms of 
international influence or limit the[ir] focus’ to just one 
factor or process.30 They go on to argue that these analyses 
fail to acknowledge adequately that ‘democratic diffusion’ was 
‘“spatially” dependent’, and that ‘Western efforts to promote 
democracy’ and ‘the impact of transnational advocacy networks’ 
vary greatly across the world.31 
 
Levitsky and Way developed their model, therefore, better to 
explain the causes and characteristics of competitive 
authoritarian orders – which have increased greatly in number 
since the end of the Cold War – because they felt that 
existing theories of regime transition did not adequately do 
so. Thus, the structure and sequencing of their model reflects 
their dissatisfactions with this literature leading it to 
place far more emphasis on the changes that have occurred in 
the global environment since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 
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interactions that take place between the international and 
domestic spheres, and the extent to which what happens in one 
shapes and influences what transpires in the other. 
 
Accordingly, two out of the three dimensions that comprise 
Levitsky and Way’s model focus on the international and the 
desire and ability of the West to exact democratic change 
elsewhere in the world. The first of these parts is linkage 
and consists of ‘the density of ties … and cross-border flows 
… among particular countries and the United States, the EU …, 
and Western-dominated multilateral institutions’. It is ‘a 
multidimensional concept that encompasses the myriad networks 
of interdependence that connect individual polities, 
economies, and societies to Western democratic communities’.32 
And its role is to explain the ‘variation in the effectiveness 
of international democratizing pressure during the post-Cold 
War period’.33 It does so by charting and measuring the extent 
to which the US and the EU are likely to notice, and are 
prepared to punish, any authoritarian abuses committed by a 
regime. 
 
The ability of the European Union and the United States to 
respond in this way is determined, in part, by the second 
dimension of leverage. It encompasses the capacity of 
authoritarian regimes both to prevent any disciplinary 
measures being taken against them in the first instance, and 
to cope with that pressure which is put upon them.34 It refers 
less, therefore, to the ability of the EU and the US to 
exercise coercion, and more ‘to a country’s vulnerability’ to 
their actions.35 Accordingly, the amount of leverage Western 
governments possess over a regime is determined by a range of 
factors including: the consistency with which they pursue 
their respective foreign policies towards the country that 
they are trying to influence; the degree to which they 
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coordinate their efforts with one another; the ‘size and 
strength’ of the target country’s state and economy; and 
whether the regime in question has the backing of a ‘“black 
knight[],” or counter-hegemonic power’ to help ‘blunt the 
impact’ of the measures being taken against it.36 Indeed, black 
knights can play crucial roles in determining the success of 
the West’s liberalising endeavours.37 
 
The model’s third and final dimension is organisational power. 
It is the only part of Levitsky and Way’s thesis to focus on 
domestic factors and forces. Their approach to assessing these 
also differs from that of most other studies. They contend 
that many existing analyses focus largely or exclusively on 
the opposition (unions, civil society groups and insurgents) 
and the role it plays ‘in undermining authoritarianism and/or 
installing democracy’.38 In contrast, Levitsky and Way aver 
that ‘regime outcomes also hinge on incumbents’ capacity to 
resist’ internal threats.39 Regimes with ‘effective state and 
party organizations’, therefore, are better equipped ‘to 
prevent elite defection[s], co-opt or repress opponents, 
defuse or crack down on protest, and win (or steal) 
elections’, to do all that is necessary to survive even 
‘vigorous opposition challenges’.40 Accordingly, their model 
places less emphasis on the opposition and more on the 
organisational capacity of the regime in question. 
 
The primacy of the international over the domestic within 
Levitsky and Way’s model is reinforced by the structure and 
sequencing of their thesis. For it is designed to be applied 
in a specific order, starting with the dimension of linkage 
before moving on to that of leverage and only then considering 
the organisational power of the regime being targeted. Thus, 
the actions and interests of Western governments and 
institutions frame its analysis and exert a decisive influence 
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on whether and how a regime develops. Only those regimes 
possessed of strong state and party structures and a 
determination to endure, therefore, are likely to be able to 
withstand the West’s democratising pressure when consistently 
and resolutely applied. 
 
Levitsky and Way contend that the variation in Europe’s and 
North America’s links to and influence over other regimes is 
determined, above all, by geography and history. They argue 
that countries that are closer to the West’s borders tend to 
have stronger ties to it than those that are further removed. 
Similarly, peoples that have experienced greater historical 
interaction with the West – even if this contact was the 
result of colonisation or military occupation – are often 
bound more tightly to it than those that have not.41 Not least, 
as Western imperial expansion was usually accompanied by – 
and, indeed, drove - the spread of capitalism to these 
territories which, Levitsky and Way argue, encourages ‘cross-
border economic activity, communication, and travel’.42 
 
Levitsky and Way’s model, then, places Europe at the heart of 
a global order that, they argue, was established in the wake 
of the Cold War and which the EU has done much to shape and 
influence. Not only has the bloc accrued significant hard 
power benefits from the concentration of many of the world’s 
remaining ‘sources of external assistance’ in its hands, but 
it has also gained notable soft power advantages from its 
close association with the ‘prevailing global norms (… 
liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy)’ that it helped engender 
and propagate.43 Thus, Levitsky and Way’s understanding of 
international relations – on which their regime transition 
model is based – assumes and perpetuates Europe’s and the 
West’s global pre-eminence. 
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Levitsky and Way’s model also reflects their belief in the 
legitimacy of this arrangement, of the desirability of the 
EU’s central position within the international system. 
Confirmation that they hold this view is provided by their 
notion of the black knight. This description is clearly 
pejorative. It implies a willingness to make mischief, if not 
act malevolently, unilaterally, in pursuit of individual, 
rather than collective, goals, against universal values and 
expectations. Levitsky and Way did not coin the term,44 but use 
it as it was intended, freely and without qualification. And 
they apply it to regimes that either find themselves, on 
certain issues, on the periphery of mainstream Western 
opinion, or that have never been part of the West. They apply 
it to regimes that, either occasionally or habitually, want to 
limit or contain Western power and influence. They apply it 
most frequently to Russia and China, and less often to France 
and Japan.45 By having the means to resist the mainstream West, 
and in doing so successfully on occasion, these counter 
hegemonic regimes are cast in a negative light. In being 
described as black knights they are portrayed as anti-Western 
which, by extension, makes them anti-democratic, pro-
authoritarian, regressive and overtly self-interested. 
 
Tunisia’s and Mauritania’s links to Europe and the EU 
On the eve of the Arab Spring, both the Tunisian and 
Mauritanian regimes can be described as competitive 
authoritarian. Each was led by someone who had seized power in 
a coup d’état, yet had retained it through the ballot box. 
Each was mindful of, and sought to act in accordance with, the 
national constitution. Each held regular elections; local, 
provincial, parliamentary and presidential. Each allowed rival 
political parties and opposition candidates to campaign and to 
participate in these votes. Each permitted civil society 
groups to be established and to operate openly. Each promised 
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to reinforce the rule of law and to strengthen the country’s 
democratic institutions and processes. And each was praised 
for doing so by the West.46 
 
Yet neither was fully democratic. Elections were held 
regularly in compliance with each country’s constitution, but 
were never truly free and fair. The incumbents – Presidents 
Ben Ali of Tunisia and Abdel Aziz of Mauritania – and the 
electoral candidates who stood for their ruling parties – the 
Democratic Constitutional Rally (Rassemblement Constitutionel 
Démocratique, RCD) and the Union for the Republic (Union pour 
la République, UR) respectively – enjoyed significant unfair 
advantages over their rivals. Indeed, between elections and 
during them, the political playfields in both countries were 
tilted decisively in favour of those already in power. This 
much was confirmed repeatedly by the size of their respective 
‘victories’. In the last elections in which they each 
participated, Ben Ali secured 89.2 percent (2009) and Abdel 
Aziz 81 percent (2014) of the vote, while the RCD and the UR 
took 75.2 percent (2009) and 50.6 percent (2013) of the seats 
in their respective country’s parliament.47 
 
Yet, this classification, especially in the case of Tunisia, 
is open to challenge. For while the Ben Ali regime permitted 
the existence of channels by which opposition candidates and 
parties could ‘contest legally for executive power’,48 the 
quality of these avenues was such that his grip on the 
presidency and government was never truly threatened prior to 
his eventual overthrow. Thus, while the Tunisian regime 
conforms to the letter of Levitsky and Way’s definition of 
competitive authoritarian, it arguably enjoyed greater 
security than that. That this was the case serves to emphasise 
the EU’s failure to put greater democratising pressure on 
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Tunis and Brussels’s willingness to suspend its disbelief of 
the regime’s direction of political travel. 
 
Despite being formally competitive authoritarian, Tunisia had 
high linkage to the EU. Levitsky and Way calculate the 
strength of a country’s bonds to the West by assessing the 
intensity of its relations with the EU and the US across 
several areas of activity. They focus on ‘flows of trade, 
investment, and credit’ (economic); ‘diplomatic and military 
ties as well as participation in Western-led alliances, 
treaties, and international organizations’ 
(intergovernmental); ‘the share of … [the target state’s] 
elite that is educated in the West and/or has professional 
ties to … universities’ there (technocratic); ‘flows of people 
across borders’, and the size, influence and importance of 
‘diaspora networks’ in Europe and North America (social); 
‘flows of information … via telecommunications, Internet 
connections, and Western media penetration’ (information); and 
‘local ties to Western-based NGOs, international religious and 
party organizations, and other transnational’ associations 
(civil society).49 This assessment determines whether a 
country’s links to the West are graded high, medium or low. 
 
Tunisia has strong links to the European Union in each of 
these categories of connection. In 2016, as in previous years, 
it both imported (55.8 percent) and exported (77.4 percent) 
more to the bloc than it did to the rest of the world 
combined.50 It also received remittances from its citizens 
living abroad – most of whom were based in Europe – amounting 
to $1.7 billion or 4.3 percent of its annual GDP.51 It is a 
member of each of the EU’s four policy frameworks for the 
region,52 and was of one the first partner states to sign both 
its association agreement (1995),53 and its action plan 
(2004).54 It was, as a result, given nearly a billion Euros 
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(€945.6 million) in Accompanying Measures funding (Mesures 
d’Accompagnement, MEDA) over this period,55 and €140 million in 
Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) 
funding between 2011 and 2013.56 
 
Tunisia’s technocratic links to the EU are similarly strong. 
Of the current 28 government ministers (August 2017), 16 (57 
percent) have studied in either Europe or North America. The 
time these important public figures spent abroad in this 
fashion is typical of many thousands of their compatriots. 
Indeed, the EU has long been the preferred destination of 
Tunisian students studying abroad. Of the 17,814 of the them 
who attended university overseas in 2014, 13,983 (78.5 
percent) were enrolled at institutions in the EU.57 The clear 
majority (8,995) were based in France where they comprised the 
fourth largest contingent of foreign nationals in the 
country’s universities.58 These students form part of the 
ongoing mass movement of people between Tunisia and the 
European Union. As of 2014, there were an estimated 442,000 
and 15,007 first-generation Tunisian and EU migrants living in 
Europe and Tunisia respectively.59 Also in that year, Tunisia 
received 7.1 million visitors,60 most of whom (6 million, 84.5 
percent) were from the EU.61  
 
Inevitably, the strength of Tunisia’s human ties to the 
European Union, and certain member states in particular, has 
generated and sustains a wide range of important civil society 
links between the country and the EU. Tunisian groups and 
organisations have long been actively involved in a host of 
pan-Mediterranean bodies. The Committee for the Respect of 
Freedom and Human Rights (Comité pour le Respect des Libertés 
et des Droits de l’Homme, CRLDHT), for example, is a member of 
the influential transnational EuroMed Rights network which 
seeks ‘to promote and strengthen human rights and democratic 
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reform in the Euro-Mediterranean region’ by developing and 
fortifying ‘partnerships between non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), disseminat[ing] human rights values, 
advocat[ing] for them and increas[ing] the capabilities of 
local partners’.62 The CRLDHT was established long before the 
Arab Spring began (in 1996) to promote ‘freedom, human rights 
and democracy in Tunisia’, is headed by a Tunisian national 
(Tarek Ben Hiba) and maintains its head office in Paris.63 Like 
many other such civil society groups, therefore, the CRLDHT is 
trans-Mediterranean in both outlook and organisation. 
 
Finally, Tunisia has strong information links to the EU. The 
mass movement of people between the two is one important way 
in which news, knowledge and, most crucially, alternative 
interpretations of what is taking place in the country is 
disseminated to and around its population. The past 15 years 
have also witnessed a massive expansion in mobile phone and 
internet use in the country. In 2000, just 1.2 percent of the 
populace subscribed to a cell phone service, but by 2015 129.9 
percent did.64 Similarly, in 2000 only 2.7 percent of the 
population used the internet. By 2015, however, this number 
had jumped to 48.5 percent.65 By these means, therefore, 
Tunisians are increasingly able to follow what is taking place 
in the EU and to learn what Europe thinks is happening in 
their country. 
 
Mauritania, in contrast, has weaker links to the European 
Union in all of these categories of connection. In 2016, its 
balance of trade with the bloc (31.5 percent) was the lowest 
in the Maghreb as it was the only country in the region to 
export more to China (32.2 percent) than to the EU (23.7 
percent).66 And while it is a member of the UfM and the only 
Maghreb country to take part in the EU’s Strategy for Security 
and Development in the Sahel (SSDS), it has not joined either 
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the ENP, the EMP or the PfDSP. As a result, it has concluded 
neither an association agreement nor an action plan with 
Brussels so has not been awarded any MEDA or SPRING funding.  
 
Mauritania’s technocratic links to the EU are also not as 
strong as Tunisia’s although they are still significant. Of 
its 30 government ministers (August 2017), 15 (50 percent) 
have completed at least some of their higher education in 
either Europe or North America.67 The educational experiences 
of these public figures, though, are far less typical than 
those of their compatriots. Not only do significantly fewer 
Mauritanians study and live in the EU, but hardly any 
Europeans visit or spend time in Mauritania. Indeed, it is the 
only Maghreb country for which a majority of the members of 
its diaspora reside in other parts of Africa rather than the 
EU. Of the 198,307 Mauritanians living abroad in 2013, 145,500 
(or 73.4 percent) were based elsewhere in the continent and 
only 28,897 (or 14.5 percent) in Europe.68 Its weaker human 
links to the EU also mean that it has fewer civil society 
connections to the bloc than Tunisia or any of its other 
northern neighbours. Indeed, it is the only one of the 
region’s countries that does not participate in the EuroMed 
network. 
 
Finally, Mauritania’s information links to the EU are also 
slightly weaker than those of Tunisia. Over the past 15 years, 
the mobile phone and internet usage of its citizens have grown 
exponentially. In 2000, just 0.5 percent of its population had 
cell phone contracts. By 2015, though, this figure had leapt 
to 89.3 percent.69 Similarly, in 2000 only 0.1 percent of its 
populace used the internet, but by 2015 15.1 percent did.70 
Mauritanians, then, are much better equipped than they used to 
be to access additional and alternative sources of 
information, and communicate and discuss this news with one 
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another. Yet even so, they are still not quite as well 
connected as Tunisians. Not only do fewer of them have mobile 
phones and use the internet than their northern neighbours, 
but their country does not receive nearly the same number of 
foreign visitors and is not penetrated by Western media to 
anything like the same extent. 
 
Tunisia, then, continues to have high linkage to the European 
Union. This should mean, according to Levitsky and Way, that 
Brussels takes the keenest possible interest in the actions of 
its government and would be likely to respond to any 
authoritarian abuses that it might commit. Mauritania, in 
contrast, still has only medium links to the EU. This means 
that Brussels is less attuned to, and concerned with, what is 
taking place there, and, as a consequence, less likely to 
respond to any repressive or undemocratic measures taken by 
its government. Based on this analysis, Tunisia’s rejection of 
authoritarian rule should have occurred much sooner and as a 
result of the democratising pressure put on Ben Ali’s regime 
by the EU and the wider West. And while Mauritania’s 
liberalisation remains less certain, the country’s connections 
to Europe are still sufficiently strong to render its 
competitive authoritarian order vulnerable to pressure from 
Brussels.  
 
The EU’s leverage over Tunisia and Mauritania 
Levitsky and Way calculate the strength of the West’s leverage 
over a regime by assessing the target state’s economic and 
military capabilities, and control of certain strategic 
resources, against a range of pre-determined thresholds. They 
argue that Western governments have low leverage over a 
country if it either has a large economy with a total GDP of 
more than $1 billion; or, is a major oil producer that, in the 
course of a year, extracts an average of one million barrels 
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of crude a day; or, has reliable and consistent access to 
nuclear weapons. They maintain that the West has medium 
leverage over a country if it either has a mid-sized economy 
with a total GDP of between $50 billion and $100 billion; or, 
is a secondary oil producer that, in a 12-month period, pumps 
an average of 200,000 to one million barrels a day; or, is the 
site of ‘a major security-related foreign policy issue for the 
United States and/or the EU’; or, is the recipient of 
considerable amounts of bilateral aid (totalling at least one 
percent of its GDP), most of which is provided by a black 
knight power. Finally, they contend that the West has high 
leverage over a regime if it does not meet any of these 
criteria.71 
 
The EU has had high leverage over Tunisia from before the Arab 
Spring began. For the country has but a small economy,72 is 
neither a major nor an intermediate oil producer, possesses no 
nuclear weapons, and does not have the backing of a black 
knight patron. It still lacks, therefore, both the means and 
the friends that Levitsky and Way say that it needs to able to 
withstand the democratising pressure that Brussels could put 
on it. These deficiencies continue to be offset to a small 
degree, by the country’s location in a region of immense 
importance to the EU. Europe’s longstanding anxieties over 
Islamist terrorism, energy, and illegal migration have 
established North Africa as a region of special interest to 
its members and institutions.   
 
Nevertheless, at the time the Arab Spring began, Brussels’s 
leverage over Tunisia was still high rather than medium as the 
country was less affected by these issues than many of its 
neighbours. Indeed, the dangers posed by Islamist terror 
groups operating in and out of its territory have only 
developed recently, since the fall of Ben Ali’s regime, and 
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are still not as grave as those presented by factions and 
forces based elsewhere in the region. Tunisia certainly was, 
therefore, and to a lesser extent remains, a security 
backwater as it neither faces nor raises the sorts and size of 
problems that do Libya, Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Algeria and other 
countries. 
 
Tunisia’s comparative stability helps explain why the European 
Union and the wider West supported Ben Ali and his competitive 
authoritarian regime and declined to bring the full weight of 
their leverage wholly to bear upon it in pursuit of their 
purported goal of effecting its liberalisation. In addition to 
their concerns over the security and stability of the region, 
the EU and the US bought into, and thereby helped perpetuate, 
‘three mythologies’ about Ben Ali’s Tunisia - ‘its economic 
miracle, its democratic gradualism and its laicité’ – which 
further helped dissuade them from putting more democratising 
pressure on the regime.73 Despite its geographic and historical 
proximity to Tunisia, therefore, the EU did not pursue, let 
alone achieve, the political liberalisation that Levitsky and 
Way say is a defining feature of its international role. 
 
The EU has had medium leverage over Nouakchott from before the 
Arab Spring began. The country only has a small economy,74 is 
neither a major nor an intermediate oil producer, has no 
nuclear weapons, and does not currently have the backing of a 
black knight patron. Like Tunisia, therefore, it remains ill-
equipped to resist effectively the democratising pressure that 
the European Union could put upon it. Unlike Tunisia, however, 
it was, and still is, heavily involved at least two ‘security-
related foreign policy’ issues of great importance to Europe, 
namely, containing and countering the various Islamist terror 
groups operating across the southern Maghreb and West Africa, 
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and managing and restricting the flow of illegal migrants 
towards the EU. 
 
Since the mid-2000s, Mauritania has involuntarily played host 
to several armed factions. Its long and porous borders, vast 
and sparsely populated territory, and small and poorly 
equipped security forces made it an ideal location in which 
such groups could plan, prepare, rest and rebuild. Most of the 
bands that were based there were connected either by origin, 
affiliation or personnel to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM).75 In addition to carrying out dozens of bombings, 
shootings and abductions in Mauritania itself,76 they used its 
territory as a staging post from which to attack targets in 
neighbouring countries and extend their influence southwards 
into the Sahel and West Africa.77 It was the presence and 
activities of these factions, and the generally low ability of 
Mauritania’s security forces to deal with them, that prompted 
the EU to set up the SSDS and 5 + 5 Initiative. Unlike 
Tunisia, therefore, Mauritania found itself in the frontline 
of the global fight against Islamist terrorism before the Arab 
Spring began. 
 
The European Union also considers the country a vital partner 
in its efforts to control and restrict the flow of illegal 
migrants from and through North Africa.78 In addition to being 
the closest landmass to the Canary Islands, the country lies 
directly to the south of Morocco, the only North African state 
to share a border with the EU. Not only has the country long 
been a key staging post for migrants seeking to make the short 
sea voyage to this Spanish territory, but it is also a major 
thoroughfare for others trying to reach Europe via Morocco and 
Algeria. Furthermore, it has come to play a vital ‘dual role’ 
for Brussels as both a ‘receiver of “returned” migrants’ who 
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have been intercepted while attempting to get to the EU, and 
as a ‘returner of migrants’.79 
 
Paradoxically, while these security-related foreign policy 
issues have served to reduce the European Union’s leverage 
over Mauritania from high to medium, they have had less 
consistent impact on Brussels’s willingness to discipline 
Nouakchott. For whereas the EU responded to the 2005 and 2008 
military-led coups d’état by condemning the actions of those 
who seized power and temporarily suspending its aid provision, 
it declined to take any such measures during the Arab Spring 
in support of the pro-democracy protestors demanding the 
reform of the country’s competitive authoritarian order. 
 
The inconsistency of the EU’s behaviour presents Levitsky and 
Way’s thesis with at least two challenges. The first is over 
the relative importance of the various criteria that they use 
to determine the extent of the West’s leverage over a country. 
And the second, and more significant here, is over the 
consistency with which the EU uses its leverage to punish 
authoritarian abuses and promote political liberalisation. For 
even though, Brussels had shown that it had the means and the 
appetite to discipline Mauritania’s undemocratic behaviour, it 
declined to use its leverage during the Arab Spring, at a time 
when regional developments increased the pressure on North 
Africa’s authoritarian orders. 
 
Conclusion 
This article contributes to the GIR by charting and 
challenging the privileged role Levitsky and Way accord the EU 
in their celebrated model for explaining regime transitions. 
More specifically, it interrogates one of their most important 
claims: that proximity to Europe (or North America) is the key 
determinant of regime development, of whether a country 
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becomes more, or less, democratic. This interrogation has two 
aspects. One is an analysis of the normative geopolitical 
assumptions on which Levitksy and Way’s thesis is based. They 
contend that the West’s triumph in the Cold War resulted in 
its values – including that of democracy – achieving global 
primacy. Not only did the alternatives offered by the Soviet 
Union lose both credibility and their main sponsor, but the 
concentration of most of the world’s remaining development 
resources in Western hands meant that many authoritarian 
regimes had to embrace these values to receive the external 
assistance on which they relied. And even though some 
governments refused to accede to these pressures, and others 
did so only partially, leading to the exponential growth in 
the number of competitive authoritarian orders in the world, 
the West and its values still gained pre-eminence.  
 
This supposition informs the structure and sequencing of 
Levitsky and Way’s model both of which help set it apart from 
existing explanations. Indeed, their thesis places far more 
emphasis than other accounts on the West’s influence which it 
charts and measures through its dimensions of linkage and 
leverage. The former refers to the range and intensity of ties 
between a country and Europe, while the latter denotes the 
ability of target states to withstand whatever democratising 
pressure is put upon them by the EU. Thus, Levitsky and Way 
place Europe at the heart of international affairs. 
Authoritarian regimes are under pressure to liberalise because 
of the normative and material shifts in international power 
brought about by the end of the Cold War. And the actual 
processes of democratisation are both driven and determined by 
a country’s geographical and historical propinquity to Europe. 
 
The other aspect of the article’s interrogation is its 
assessment of the validity of Levitsky and Way’s claim that 
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the European Union habitually acts as a democratising force in 
the world. It challenges this assertion by drawing on the 
cases of Tunisia and Mauritania at the start of the Arab 
Spring. Despite being located similar distances from Europe 
and their parallel experiences as former territories of 
France’s overseas empire, their respective relations with 
Brussels were quite different. Not only were Tunisia’s links 
to the EU stronger than those of Mauritania, but the bloc had 
greater leverage over Tunis than it did Nouakchott. Yet, 
despite these differences, both countries were competitive 
authoritarian at the time the protests began. Up until that 
point, the EU had failed to bring about the political 
liberalisation of either regime. Despite having the means to 
put potentially decisive democratising pressure on Tunis, it 
did not do so. And even though it had been prepared to 
discipline Nouakchott’s authoritarian abuses in the recent 
past, it declined to intervene in a comparable way on this 
occasion. Tunisia’s and Mauritania’s experiences at the start 
of the Arab Spring challenge the image of the EU presented by 
Levitsky and Way. In making these arguments, therefore, the 
article not only exposes the Eurocentrism at the heart of 
their thesis, but highlights its deleterious impact on the 
explanatory prowess of their model. 
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